Group Status Beliefs, Grievance, and American Politics C-SPAM Distinguished Scholars Colloquium: Dr. Jamie Druckman October 12, 2026 === You can see the spreading of the parties apart, particularly Republicans have moved to the right. And then, as is well known, in terms of the public, there's been this massive increase in affective polarization, such that partisans do not like one another as much as they used to. ItÕs been a pretty dramatic increase in affective polarization. Of course, the parties have changed fairly dramatically, particularly the Republican Party, which was captured with this New York Times article right after the 2024 election. And I think for anybody's paid attention to American politics, the Republican Party is very different today than it was 20 years ago. What are the questions we're asking in this project? We're asking fairly large questions, one of which is: What characterizes the divide among voters in American politics today, in terms of electoral, partisan and policy preferences? I'm moving beyond party here. I'll talk about party, but I'll be clear in a moment where party fits into this. And then: What characterizes beliefs about society, institutions and identity? So put in short: What is the underlying cleavage that is defining American politics today, and how does that all work? So that's really what we're interested in. That is beyond and within parties. So we're not dismissing the role of parties. Parties are incredibly important. But we're looking kind of underneath parties, and then also between the parties, as will be evident in how I proceed. So just to give you a preview of what I'm going to show you, we're going to say that group status beliefs Ñ that is, beliefs about race, gender and religion Ñ are a fundamental cleavage in American politics today. That divides the parties, it explains dynamics within the parties, and it explains a lot of things in terms of how people perceive politics and society. It characterizes beliefs about society, institutions and identity. WeÕre going to argue that it is a mixture or an intersection of groups status beliefs with grievance. By grievance, I mean Ð I'll talk more specifically, but you can think victimhood is one of the defining characteristics of grievance. That underlies perceptions of discrimination that occur in society, institutional trust, and even conceptions of American identity. And so the bottom line is that American public opinion in this contemporary era reflects group status beliefs and grievance that operate between and within projects. This is all kind of the contemporary period, so I can't speak to how this has changed over time, although I'm going to speak to kind of why I think this is going on in the contemporary period. ThatÕs a bit of an overview. What I'm going to do is I'm going to start by first talking about group status beliefs. I'll briefly define them, because theyÕre probably familiar to those people in the room, why they're consequential Ð then look at voting and partisanship and issue positions and issue constraints. Then I'll move to grievance and kind of go through a series of similar exercises with different outcome variables. Okay. So let me pretty quickly go through group status beliefs. These are beliefs about which groups should hold power in society. Power, broadly speaking: social power, economic power, and of course, we're particularly interested in political power. We are using these labels. We went back and forth one on how to label these things. But ÒTraditional Group Status BeliefsÓ would be elevated in historically advantaged groups Ð so this would be people who are white male Christians Ð in public life. [In this line of thinking], those are the people who should have more prominent, powerful roles in public life. In what we are calling the ÒModernÓ Ð we were using ÒProgressiveÓ for a while, but there were variety reasons we didn't want to use that, so we're going with ÒModernÓ Ð beliefs would be on the other edge. They would be advocating for historically disadvantaged groups Ð so nonwhite, female, non-Christians Ð in public life. So, again, kind of where you stand on these things. Debates about this can be found since the beginning of the country, right? These things were always present. They've always been very defining of the country. But there are reasons, I'll talk more in a little bit, where we think that they are even more defining and kind of salient today. The specific kind of measurement that we're using and constructs that we're looking at are racial conservativism, beliefs about gender roles Ð specifically, hostile sexism Ð and Christian nationalism. There are other divides that I think obviously are important to American politics, class, urban/rural, and I'm going to just put those aside. I can talk about those later if anybody would like. But we're not we're not focusing on those. Very quickly: racial resentment is the belief that Black people do not deserve special government assistance. This is a classic item of Irish, Italians, Jewish and other minorities who overcame prejudice and worked their way up. [The belief is] Black people should do the same without special favors. So that's implying traditional order where there aren't really structural interventions to assist any particular group. ThatÕs where we're getting at with that. Hostile sexism: a view of gender relationships as competitive with women, threatening menÕs status in society. An example item there is: how often do women exaggerate problems they experience at work? And again, that implies a traditional order, with men in public spaces and women in private spaces. So again, it's traditional perceptions of how society works. Christian nationalism is the idea that America was founded as a Christian nation. This is an example item: The federal government should promote Christian values. And again, it applies this very traditional order of things and opposes secularization trends that have gone on in the 21st century. These beliefs are all connected to one another. There's a latent construct: probably a lot of the psychologists and some of the political scientists have probably already realized that this is really similar to Social Dominance Orientation. WeÕll get into Social Dominance Orientation a little bit. It's really a preference for hierarchical social structures and group-based inequalities. We separate these out, though, in a lot of what we look at, because from a political perspective, you're appealing to different groups of people who hold different beliefs. While there's overlap between people who might hold one of these belief systems and the other, there's correlations, they're not synonymous with one another. You're going to use different appeals to appeal to different groups ÐÊalthough I will bring them all together in some of the analysis. One thing that I want to emphasize here is that this is not identity politics as commonly construed, at least in popular narratives of identity politics. In that construal, voters are making decisions on the groups to which they belong, the demographic groups to which they affiliate with. And we're arguing here, we're not saying that's not part of the story, but we're saying that kind of more than that, it's not really the identities that people hold, but it's the beliefs about the identities. Right? It's the beliefs about which identities should be in positions of power and which ones should not. We expect that the beliefs are actually going to play a little bit of a stronger role than the identities themselves. But again, they are related to one another. I will talk a little bit later about kind of the relationship between groups to which people belong and the beliefs that they hold. Before I do that, though, I'll go back and say again, I'm not going to be able to present you with over-time data. Our data come from 2020 to 2025, to just get that out of the way. There's reasons that we focused on this. There are reasons why we think this is particularly salient at this point in time in American politics, and a lot of that has to do with the change that has gone on, and the demographic change that has brought the relevance of some of these identity considerations. As is well known, there's an ongoing, dramatic demographic shift with projections that the white population will become a minority population, sometimes mid-century, maybe closer to 2060. We also had the election of Obama, so the first Black president, and so on and so forth. Gender, obviously there's not a demographic change in gender, but there has been increasing power of women in office, women leading corporations, and so on, and so forth. This is just a graph of women in Congress, women in the House. It's still pretty low, but you can see the trend is going up to 30 percent. We've had two women presidential nominees, obviously, so that's also a potential threat to the traditional order. We have kind of the rising power of Black people, a rising power of women, and so that could be considered a potential threat. And then we have this religious trend, this massive secularization. You can see the percentage of Christians in the population since the mid-century, about here. We were kind of above 75 percent, and now we're down to about 63 percent. And even more kind of interesting is the trend in the religiously unaffiliated, which the survey researchers call the Òreligious nones,Ó which I think is always a cute pun. There were projections at some point in the early 2020s that the Christians would become a minority population, as well. I think those projections have changed, so that's no longer projected, because it's really stabilized. But nonetheless, that trend is a pretty clear potential threat to a traditional order of things. Let me talk about cleavages. So for anybody in comparative politics in the room, this will be familiar to you, but for the rest of you, this might be a little bit new. In political science, when we think about cleavages, we think about kind of these really fundamental rifts that divide society, that end up kind of driving how people are making decisions, and ultimately political parties themselves. Parties themselves, as I said, what happens is that there's some transformation in society, and that might reorient the population. Then there's going to be some kind of a new alignment of what is that cleavage that divides people. And so what are these transformations? If you go back historically, they're things like the Industrial Revolution. TheyÕre things like centralization, urbanization. But in the 21st century, you can start to think about the changing demographics and you can the disruptions that I talked about earlier. Those are pretty fundamental disruptions in the common course of American politics. So that's one thing, when you have these major transformations that have taken place. Another thing is that when we think about cleavages, you have to think about the number of parties that are allowed in a given political system. And in the American political system, you're really never going to have more than two parties. We have these two parties, and so that kind of constrains the amount of cleavages that you're going to see. Then you have political entrepreneurs who have really changed the way that we talk about issues, and that drives the cleavages that emerge as well. The point of me going through all of this is to say we've seen kind of this mix of transformation, we're kind of capped at two power parties Ð and I'm going to talk a little bit in a moment about political entrepreneurs Ð and these things put together have really brought out the salience of these group status-based attitudes. ThatÕs kind of the argument that we're putting forth. The point is that this is more than the product of just parties and party elites giving cues. This is actually a fundamental cleavage that is how people think about politics generally, even within the parties. In terms of the rhetorical part, what we're calling the change permission structure ÐÊso that's where political entrepreneurs are coming out and using different rhetorical tactics. We think about permission structure of what is and what is not acceptable to say in American politics. ThatÕs really also changed in the 21st century. That changed a bit with Obama's election, which really ÐÊwe had this era where there was this idea that you could really only use implicit appeals to race. That really changed with Obama, when we started to see more explicit appeals to race after his election, and after 2010 or so. We also see increased women officeholders, as I said. But you've also seen an increase in misogynistic statements during campaigns. That was very clear during Hillary Clinton's campaign in particular. So, again, kind of a shift in how politics was spoken about. Then there's been a shift in how religion is talked about in politics. Some of that has been brought on by Supreme Court decisions, which have kind of loosened the separation of between church and state. But the point being is, when we get to Trump ÐÊI have a bunch of quotes from Trump. I'm not going to even going to show you. TheyÕre all quotes that everybody's familiar with, right? Ð he talks about politics in ways that people had not talked about politics before. And just to give you a sense that this is kind of something people have acknowledged from the start, this is [a quote] from one of John McCain's campaign advisors in 2016: ÒTrump created a permissible environment for other speech.Ó He kind of changed what was normatively appropriate. Joe Biden, this is before the debate: ÒNo president in our history has spoken like that before.Ó And then, this was a New York Times reporter who said: ÒThere's a sense in this current era that Trump and his allies feel emboldened to say the quiet part out loud.Ó This kind of really helped bring this cleavage forth, so to speak. You have these changes in the environment, you have these changed social structures, and then you have this rhetorical effort to politicize and bring this cleavage forth, particularly around issues of group differences. I'm going to skip over those quotes to actually get to some data. These are the infamous quotes. So the idea here is a very simple hypothesis: As racial resentment, hostile sexism or Christian nationalism, i.e. traditional values ÐÊas those become higher and you move away from what we call modern values, the likelihood of supporting voting for Trump or being a Republican should increase. And you should see the opposite for voting for Harris or being identified as Democratic in the 2024 election. As I mentioned, we should see that this is having a larger effect than any demographic identities themselves. What about partisanship? I've pointed to this a few times. Again, we think it matters a lot. But we think [group status beliefs] should underpin partisanship. We should actually see these beliefs having a difference within party. So when you look within Democrats, we should see movement, for example, towards Trump, even within Democrats. It was a small percentage of people, but those people should be the ones who are moving towards more traditional values. So if it's a fundamental cleavage, that's what should be going on. The data from this project are from the Annenberg Institutions of Democracy Study. It's a panel data set that ran from 2019 to 2026, and so it's a large amount of data. The data set originated Ð at the beginning, it was just four swing states. In about 2022 or 2023, they complemented it with a national sample. And basically when we look by state or by national sample, everything looks pretty much the same, which speaks to the nationalization of politics, and also just the nature of what we're looking at. So what I'm going to show you is we're bringing this all together. We have 37 waves of data. We didn't measure everything in 37 waves. I'm going to show you a little bit of panel results, but a lot of it are just correlational results within different cross-sections or across cross-sections. When I show you this, they're not they're not literally bivariate correlations, but they're models that are kind of controlling for things like partisanship and demographics and everything else that we're looking at. Very briefly, first, coming back to group identity and these beliefs. This is just a simple figure of where we asked people: How important is your gender identity, how important is your racial identity, and how important is your religious identity? As you see here, if you're a man and your gender identity is more important, you become higher in hostile sexism. If you're a woman and your identity is more important, you become lower in hostile sexism. For race, if you're nonwhite, you become less racially resentful. If you're white, you become more racially resentful. There is a relationship between the importance of your identity and these beliefs. But in the work, we kind of actually look just amongst people who view these identities as really important to see if our results hold up even amongst that subgroup, and they generally do. The relationship is not as strong. It's clear, but it's not super strong, right? It's not. There are clearly different constructs going on here. You can have people who are not very strong in a given belief, but still are pretty high on these group status belief attitudes. Okay. So first thing I want to show you is just for racial resentment, hostile sexism and Christian nationalism. And then I put in social dominance here. And so what you can see here is that these split the parties fairly well, especially racial resentment. Right? Racial resentment is really quite sorted between the parties. This is just the density plots by party of red and blue. You can see hostile sexism is a little bit less sorted, which is going to become relevant a little bit later in something I'll show you. Christian nationalism is pretty sorted, social dominance a little bit less so. But generally speaking, the parties are pretty sorted by these group status beliefs, which is probably not entirely surprising to anybody who's been paying attention to American politics. So IÕll show you. This is just, we're plotting from a model. We're plotting racial resentment here, and this is voted for Trump, this is amongst white people, this is amongst Black people, and this is amongst all other people. So you can see here amongst all the groups, even against amongst Black respondents, as levels of racial resentment goes up, the likelihood of them voting for Trump goes up. You can see there's obviously a big racial gap just in voting, so identity matters, as well. In terms of partisanship, you see a similar dynamic. I'm just going to show you the similar graphs for hostile sexism and then Christian nationalism. So hostile sexism, men and women, there's actually real no difference between men and women. Hostile sexism is really driving the support for Trump and their party ID here. Again, this is going to become relevant a little bit later when we talk about Harris. But I'll point out again that racial resentment, it's very well sorted, and identity matters a lot, whereas hostile sexism is less well sorted, but it seems like the demographic identity matters much less. Christian nationalism, the blue line is other religion. The white line is no religion. But you can see there's not a lot of space. As you become more and more Christian nationalist, you become more likely to support Trump and more likely to identify as Republican. And of course, the flip of all of this stuff, right? If we were looking at this all in terms of modern beliefs, you would become more likely to have voted for Harris in this case and more likely to identify with the Democratic Party. So when we just look at the group status beliefs versus identity ÐÊthis is voting for Trump. You can see the group status belief has this. This is the size of the effect of group status beliefs versus the size of the effect of being a man or a woman. This is the identity, the racial identity versus the racial resentment. You can see that's a bit of a smaller difference. And then you can see for Christian nationalism again, Christian nationalist beliefs versus identity. You can see that clearly the beliefs are having a larger correlation with the voting outcome. So that's fairly straightforward stuff. I'm going to come back later and look within the parties. But that's just a little bit of the beginnings of the story of kind of the power of these attitudes in shaping political preferences. One of the neat things about these data is we can take advantage of what happened in this debate. And so everybody's familiar with what happened during this debate, so I won't rehearse all that went on that night. But what we have then is we have a switch from a white male candidate to a Black Asian female candidate. So what's driving people's vote choice in terms of moving from one candidate to the other? It gives us a pretty unique opportunity to see, like, why do some people who supported Biden suddenly do not support Harris? Like, what's driving their beliefs? What we find here ÐÊso this is a hostile sexism average score. This is using the panel data. These are the same people who were supporting Biden and supporting Harris. They have the lowest hostile sexism score. These are people who were not supporting Biden but then they ended up supporting Harris, so they're a little bit higher in hostile sexism. But you can see here the people who supported Biden and then opted to not support Harris Ð which means they either didn't vote, they didn't want to vote, or they ended up supporting Trump Ð they have higher hostile sexism scores. So hostile sexism was driving them away from Harris a little bit. And then the people who were never going to vote for a Democrat are the highest. We find pretty similar dynamics in racial resentment. The really key comparisons are here, right? You can see that, for the people who were shifting away from Biden, there was clearly something going on here that they had these racial resentment and hostile sexism attitudes. So that raises the question of like, well, which one is more important? What we did to look at this most directly, we these we had a group of respondents who were in the data from 2020 and 2024, so when Biden was the nominee and when Harris was the nominee. We can see what drove people to not vote for Biden and then also vote for Harris. Like, who were those people who voted for Biden but then did not vote for Harris? And so what you find here, this is the coefficient on voting for Biden and voting for Harris. Racial resentment did not have a significant effect on them flipping. But hostile sexism did. Which means that as you get higher and higher and hostile sexism, you became less and less likely to vote for Harris. And these are amongst Biden voters you can think of, more or less. So hostile sexism was really a more important driver here. And this comes back to the thing I kept pointing to. It's not that racial resentment doesn't matter. It's almost that it matters too much, insofar as the parties were already so sorted on this, and there was not a lot of variance to go. All the people who are kind of low in racial resentment were already voting for Biden, and then they were kind of going to vote for Harris. There just was not a lot of room for a variance, of overlapping partisans. The Democrats were all in one side. There was nowhere for them to go. Whereas hostile sexism, you have a lot more variance within the Democratic Party, so you can get more movement on that. So again, it speaks a little bit to a challenge of the Democratic Party in terms of thinking about women candidates. There is still a fair amount of variance within the hostile sexism distribution, if you think back to the very the distribution I put up at the very beginning of the talk. So here I'm just going to come back and show you within-party. This is the thing that I've kind of hinted to a few times. This is the same graph I showed you within demographic groups, but this is within party. This is relevant insofar as you can see, even amongst the Democrats, this is merging all of the racial resentment, hostile sexism, Christian nationalism and throwing in social dominance. As you can see, as you get higher on this more traditional direction, you become more and more likely to vote for Trump. So even within the party, this is having an effect, which is really important to us, because this suggests that this is some kind of a cleavage beyond party or distinct party or underlying party, however you want to say it. So let me move to issue positions. I'm going to just shift gears a little bit. Unsurprisingly, if you look at issues that are clearly tied to the groups, you get a relationship. For example, racial resentment relates for Democrats, independents and Republicans, it relates to support for restrictive immigration policies, a highly racialized domain. If you look at sexism, abortion attitudes, hostile sexism relates to being less supportive of more access to abortion. Religion, so we used denying same sex wedding services, as you get more Christian nationalist, you're more likely to be supportive of denying that. So that's not surprising, right? These are group-based attitudes. What's more interesting to us is, to what extent to these group-based beliefs, how much do they shape attitudes that are not clearly group-based? We have 91 different issue attitudes in these data. We looked at the relationship between the group-based beliefs and all 91 of these issue attitudes, and we found that there's a significant relationship with 89 of them. We had 11 different policy domains: the economy, immigration, gun control, basically LGBTQ and gender identity politics, abortion, criminal justice, health care, electoral reform, democracy, Supreme Court reforms and foreign policy. When we look at the relationship, we can see that there are only two policies where there wasn't a significant relationship between the group status attitudes and the issue positions. The two policies were term limits for members of Congress and caps on SALT, state and local taxes. Those are issues where the parties have not taken stances and there's not a clear group. What's going on here, part of this is that the parties have taken clear viewpoints on most of these positions. People know where theyÕre supposed to map their group status beliefs into those issue positions. They're kind of led that way, in that direction. But also, the issues that I showed you before that are clearly group-based issues, those are the ones with the strongest relationships. It's pretty predictable in how you can think about that. We look by knowledge. You find the same relationships between those with little knowledge, [É] knowledge or high knowledge, which also is interesting, right? Because if you go back to historical portrayals of ideology, it's really something that varies by the level of knowledge. Group status attitudes, you don't need a lot of knowledge to know how to hold them. You don't need a lot of knowledge to know how to apply them, so we're not finding any knowledge differences here. The next question we ask is: Do group status beliefs provide any issue constraints? Issue constraints meaning, like, does it help explain the relationship between attitudes in one domain and attitudes in another domain, right? If this is really an underlying cleavage, then it should be the case that if I am high on traditional group status beliefs, that should explain why I hold attitudes on immigration in this domain, but also attitudes on abortion in this domain. It should be able to explain those things, if that makes sense to people. What we did here is we took 11 policy domains, and we took the average correlation between each item in each of these domains. So across domains. If there's an item from the abortion domain, we correlated with the foreign policy domain, and so on and so forth. The average correlation across those domains is 0.56, which is actually pretty high. If you go back to the historical work on ideological constraint. What we did then is we regressed each of the policy domains on the group status beliefs, and then we took the residuals. Right? We take the residuals, meaning that we're taking out the impact of the group status beliefs on what that correlation is. And then we kind of redid those correlations and we wanted to see what the correlations did when we removed the group status beliefs from that. What weÕre finding here is that the correlation dropped down to 0.23, which suggests that the group status beliefs are explaining, you know, a fair amount of the .56 correlation. Because as soon as we removed the group status beliefs, the correlations become substantially lower. If we remove partisanship and demographics following the same exercise, it goes down to .34, meaning that group status beliefs seem to be having a larger effect in constraining across these issue domains and partisanship and demographics combined. This sounds like ideology. We're careful to not use the word ideology for a lot of reasons. But it kind of does look like an ideology, in some sense. And just to give you a sense, this is a kind of a nice placebo test. We use grievance, which IÕll define for you in a moment. We don't expect that to have any impact on constraining issue attitudes across domains, and it doesn't have any impact on constraining issue attitudes across domains. So it wasn't some function of how we were doing this that was causing this. That we took as perhaps the best evidence that this is some kind of really fundamental cleavage in terms of American politics. So I'll summarize this part. Group status beliefs correlate with vote choice and partisanship within demographic groups. Within parties, it correlates with views on virtually any policy, regardless of an explicit connection. And group status beliefs provide constraint across policy clusters. So that's one part of kind of our story. The other part is, we wanted to say: okay, let's move away from electoral politics and policies and public policy. Let's think about larger things in society, particularly things about trust in institutions, in American identity. Then we think group status beliefs give a little bit of leverage in explaining those, but we also think we have to add this construct of grievance. What is grievance? We conceived of grievance as perception of unjust harm due to perceived malevolent intent towards oneÕs group. That's how we're defining it, with a big emphasis on perception. People who perceive themselves as suffering some kind of injustice from somebody else, a malevolence. That would be a combination of victimhood: a victim of broad social evil from a lead or institutional authority. This is a particular type of victimhood that we're looking at. Conspiracy mindset: so this is kind of not believing in a particular conspiracy theory, but kind of an orientation towards conspiratorial thinking. Social trust: people can't be trusted. And status threat: insofar as your perception that you're falling behind in society. Political scientists often use status threat to just talk about the advantaged groupÕs status threat, but I think status threat, you can be advantaged or disadvantaged, just really falling behind. But we can think of grievance for advantaged groups as writ large. It's really an inversion of the traditional structures. Right? To give you a sense of the items. And so what you can see here is, these do not separate the parties nearly as much as the group status beliefs do. Conspiracy mindset does a little bit, the fading American Dream is really a status threat. And that, Republicans are a little bit more in terms of feeling they're kind of falling behind. But perceived victimhood and social trust, there's no difference between the parties. They're completely overlapping. I'll talk you through this because I think this is a pretty telling. So these are Democrats, this is grievance, that's group status. You can see they're pretty low on group status. They're kind of just mixed around in grievance. This is where the Republicans on average sit. You can see when it comes to group status, theyÕre pretty different from Republicans. But when it comes to grievance, they're not all that different. And same with Republicans. You can see Democrats are right there. You kind of see the differences between the parties on one dimension but not the other dimension. So there's a grievance permission structure that also has come about. We see a lot of rhetoric about grievance in the last several decades. Trump is a grievance candidate. Populism is a grievance ideology in many senses. There's a lot of grievance rhetoric out there to kind of activate these things. And there's also a lot of things that have happened in the 21st century to activate feeling a sense of grievance. I'm going to look at intra-party splits, perceptions of discrimination, trust in institutions, and conceptions of American identity. So intra-party splits. This is the difference between favorability of Sanders minus the favorability of Biden. This is from 2024. What you can see here is group status plays a little bit of a role. The more that people are traditional, the less likely they were to favor Sanders, which is not super surprising. As they got more angry, aggrieved, they were more likely to favor Sanders. Because this is going in different directions, the interaction is a little bit difficult to totally interpret. The more interesting thing Ð what I really want to focus on ÐÊis this is a question that asks just Republicans: Do you identify more with Donald Trump or with the Republican Party? So what is differentiating Republicans from being Trump-supporters versus Republicans? And so here what you get is, as you get more traditional group status, you become more likely to identify with Trump or MAGA. As you get more aggrieved, you're more likely to identify with Trump and MAGA. And then there's a bonus of interaction effect there, as well. In a sense, this is not surprising. WeÕre showing this: that the people who are identifying most with Trump or with MAGA are the people who are traditional group status beliefs and also feeling fairly high levels of grievance. And I want to emphasize that, because that intersection is going to come back to be relevant in about two more things that I'm going to show you. Just very quickly putting that aside, this is just grievance and voting for Trump. This is Trump versus Biden. It may have been very different if you had Trump versus Sanders. But Trump versus Biden, Biden was not a grievance candidate. As you became more aggrieved, regardless of your demographic group, you became a little bit more likely to vote for Trump. So that's just kind of a Trump thing. Let's move on from that. This outcome is a totally different outcome. So now we're moving away from political outcomes per se. This is perceptions of discrimination in society. It asks: how much discrimination, if any, do you think there is in the United States today against this group? And then we asked about a bunch of groups. The expectation is, as you become more traditional group status beliefs, you should think that there's more discrimination against the advantaged groups. The advantage groups being white people, men, and Christians. Because your beliefs are that those groups should be the ones in political power or social power or in public spaces. And so therefore, you are going to think there's more discrimination against them, because you're thinking they're threatened in these spaces. And as you have more modern group status beliefs, you should think there's more discrimination against disadvantaged people. And grievance, we think itÕs going to increase the likelihood that you think there's discrimination against everybody, or at least or against you, but also everybody else. This is racial resentment and racial discrimination. This is discrimination against white people. This is the white people, this is the others, this is the Black people. This is how much discrimination they're facing. And what you can see here is, as racial resentment goes up, particularly white people are significantly more likely to think there's discrimination against white people. Note though it never really crosses a moderate amount. As we get to discrimination, it's Black people, as racial resentment goes, you can see that there's less and less feelings of discrimination. The interesting thing here, though Ð we have a different paper that digs into this more deeply Ð if you take this group here and this group here, they actually think there's more discrimination against white people than Black people. The people who are really high on racial resentment are perceiving more discrimination against white people than Black people, which is about at the 75th percentile. So hostile sexism and gender, you can see here that as you become higher in hostile sexism, regardless of if you're a male female, you're more likely to think there's discrimination against men, and the opposite of discrimination against women. And then religion, amongst all religious groups, as you become more and more likely be Christian nationalist, there's more discrimination against Christians and less discrimination Ð we use Muslims here. Various religious groups, they all show the same finding. Secular atheists, so on and so forth. So this is, if you're aggrieved, you think everybody is being discriminated against. I'm just showing you this as an example. We ask people: To what extent do you think your group is feeling discriminated against? And so what you can see here is amongst all partisans, you can look within any group Ð as you get more aggrieved, you just think you face more discrimination and your group faces more discrimination. Grievance is playing that role of kind of enhancing the feeling that your group is feeling mistreated and discriminated against. This is an important graph, so I'm going to I'm going to walk you through this a little bit. On the x-axis is grievance. This is discrimination against historically advantaged; we just took the average across those. So how much discrimination do white people, male and Christians face? And that's grievance. This line are the people who hold traditional beliefs. This is kind of the 90th percentile just for illustrative purposes, people who are pretty high in traditional belief holdings. What you're seeing here is, as they become more aggrieved, they are more and more likely to think historically advantaged groups are facing discrimination. Remember, these are the people who are also the really strong Trump supporters. These are the high aggrieved, traditional value, traditional group status beliefs. What we can see here, consistent with a lot of the Trump rhetoric, is that there is a discrimination against white people. So that's exactly the group that we're finding here. Then if you look at kind of modern people, as they get more aggrieved, there's no relationship. And if you look at kind of the median people, you do see a relationship Ð that as they become more aggrieved, they do think there's a more and more discrimination against white people, as well. So it's not just the MAGA people, but itÕs more so. Then if you look at historically disadvantaged groups, you can see as you became more aggrieved, in this case, there's differences, predictively, according to kind of where your group status beliefs are. But as you become more aggrieved, you think there's greater discrimination against historically disadvantaged groups. One thing I'll point out, too, is this gap is really important here in terms of the overall kind of thinking historically advantaged versus historically disadvantaged groups. But they're kind of on the outsides of each. ItÕs kind of the ordering that matters here. The point I'm trying to make is that people with traditional group status beliefs, it's not as if they think that Black people don't face any discrimination, and that only white people face an enormous amount of discrimination. That's a caricature. That's not accurate. What's going on here is that they're just more likely to think white people face discrimination and less likely to think Black people are discriminated against. They're kind of changing the order in which they're seeing things. Coming back to what I showed you before, they're likely to think that white people face more discrimination than Black people, but not by enormous amounts. ItÕs not an exaggerated, expectation. This is over time, this is by year over 2020 to 2025. This is on average change every year, because we kind of see a monotonic increase. This is kind of this is just kind of, amongst the modern people. This is the traditional people. Amongst people with traditional group status beliefs, what you see is that thereÕs increasing movement towards believing that there's discrimination against the advantaged groups. That's kind of consistent with the backlash that we kind of observed after the BLM protests. That's kind of showing up there. Okay, let me move to trust in institutions. Trust in institutions is obviously really important. We all rely on institutions to structure our lives. The question we ask is: How much, if at all, do you trust the given institution to act in the best interest of people like you? I'm going to focus here just on societal institutions, not the political institutions. We can think of societal institutions of at least four different types: political, which I'm not going to talk about; economic, which I'm also not going to talk about; what we might call norm-enforcement Ð religion, military, courts, police Ð there are certain norms of behavior, and these institutions are structured around enforcing those norms of behavior; and then knowledge-producing institutions or information-producing institutions, like education, science, journalism. Our expectation here is that, as your traditional group status beliefs become higher, you should become more trusting of norm-enforcing institutions ÐÊthose are traditional norms that should be enforced Ð and less trusting of knowledge-producing institutions, which often challenge traditional arrangements. And then, if you have high levels of grievance, you should trust no institutions. Everybody's letting you down, so you should be kind of untrusting of anybody. The left side are the norm institutions. What you can see here, grievance, they're less trusting. But as you become higher in traditional group status, you become more trusting. So it's kind of what we expected: aggrieved, you don't trust the norm-enforcing, but if you have traditional group status beliefs, you trust them more than the modern group status beliefs. If we go to the knowledge-producing institutions Ð journalists, scientists, higher education Ð grievance, still don't trust them. But if youÕre traditional group status beliefs, you become less trusting in them. What we've seen over the 21st century in particular, we've seen this polarization of trust in institutions. We've seen a decline of trust in all institutions but the military. We've seen this polarization of trust in institutions, but it's important to look at the types of institutions and how they're polarizing Ð and specifically, the kind of norm-enforcing institutions, generally speaking, Republicans are becoming more trusting of them than Democrats. That's the polarization that's taking place. Whereas for the knowledge institutions, Democrats have become more trusting than the Republicans. Both those things have kind of evolved over time. Our argument is that underlying this, or at least coordinating with it, are the group status beliefs. To me, maybe because I have other research on kind of trust in institutions, this is one of the more important things to think about in modern politics. When our trust in institutions starts to becomes so separate, that becomes very destabilizing Ð which I think we're all seeing, in real time in, in many ways. IÕll also point out, if you go to go back to the 1970s in the GSS data, there were only two institutions out of 13 that they measured that were polarized by party: business and labor. Those have not become more or less polarized. There's pretty much the same amount of polarization as there was in 1973 as there was in 2024. But every other institution has polarized over that time period. ItÕs kind of an interesting change. The last thing IÕm going to show you, because I know I've been talking for a long time: American identity. You can think of this as an exclusive view. You're in Ohio, so I don't have to tell you Ð I'm sure you've talked a lot about American identity with the gubernatorial campaign. IÕve mentioned to a few people: I saw more TV commercials in the 10 minutes this morning that I put on the TV than I had seen all fall. So Western New York, we don't get any congressional [ads]. Ten minutes I was like, I can't take this anymore! I think I saw the same commercials three times in that 10 minutes. So, heritage-based or English-speaking, Christian, and in an inclusive view, creedal Ð based on shared values and ideals. We ask these questions. Some people say the following things are important for being truly American. Others say that they're not important. How important are these? So, being born in the US, speaking English, being Christian, supporting equal opportunity, respecting other people's culture, and so on. We separated these out. We've gotten some pushback on maybe we shouldn't have separated them out into two different metrics. Maybe that is a reasonable comment, but this is what we have. We have two different measures. I'll just show you what we find. As you become more traditional in your group status beliefs, regardless of your party, you start to see the components of the exclusive view becoming more and more important. As you become more traditional in the group status beliefs, you see inclusive parts of American identity becoming less important. When we throw in grievance Ð sorry, this is the other regression table ÐÊso the exclusive view, you throw in grievance. The weird thing that we don't totally understand is grievance, as you get more aggrieved, you see both of these as more important. We don't really know what's going on there. The more important thing is this interaction between grievance and group status. As you get both traditional group status beliefs and aggrieved, you're more likely to endorse the exclusive view of American identity. And so again, that's that same group of voters who are identified most strongly with Trump. They're also more likely to see discrimination against white people, and they're also more likely to see American identity in these exclusive terms. Finally, last table Ð sorry, there was a third regression table Ð this is Òimmigrants are burdenÓ and Òimmigrants are culturally distant, distinctÓ in the Great Replacement conspiracy. In two of the three items you can find this relationship between group status and grievance, again, showing that same group of voters, why immigration has become such an important policy to them. In many ways, I've kind of had this through-line through this talk, which is also why I presented everything in terms of traditional status beliefs in Trump rather than the reverse. It's because we're trying to understand what the kind of Trump voters look like, given the way that he's reconfigured the party system. ItÕs a story that in some sense is very intuitive and what we kind of probably all intuitively sense, but it's kind of interesting to see the extent to which it maps out in terms of: these are aggrieved traditional groups status-belief voters. They identify with Trump. They view there's more discrimination against white people. They see American identity as exclusive. And they are not very big fans of immigrants. That's kind of consistent with the rhetoric, and partially why that's probably been very successful, because this was there. These group status attitudes are remarkably stable. In our 6-year panel, we measured them several times. They never budged. And I think people going back have been measuring these things, and they're very stable, longstanding beliefs. To summarize, group status beliefs correlate with trust in norm-enforcing institutions, perceptions of discrimination, exclusive/inclusive American identity, view of immigrants, as I already showed you, electoral and partisan policy preferences. Grievance correlates with distrust in all institutions, perceptions of discrimination, exclusive American identity, opposition to immigrants, and intra-party factions, support for Trump. To step back very briefly: American politics in the 21st century. You know, weÕve had a lot of demographic change along the lines of race, gender and religion. We've had a lot of disruptions. And by disruptions, I'm thinking that is feeding into grievance, particularly probably economic disruptions and the growing economic inequality that's gone on. But also technological disruptions, health Ð Covid ÐÊdisruptions, social disruptions. We've had many wars. ItÕs a lot of stuff to be aggrieved about. We have these things going on, and these divisions have accelerated, or this has accelerated divisions in many ways. Not just those based on partisanship, but things that underlie partisanship. The argument, again, is that underlying all this, there is a foundational cleavage of group status beliefs. It aligns with the divisions between parties, policies, views of society, institutional trust, and American identity, and it provides policy consistency and constraints. And then grievance is a style of politics that prompts anti-institutionalism, social pessimism and political exclusion Ð and the Trump base, which I've emphasized probably more than enough. Where does this leave us in politics today? What we end up with instead of kind of a politics based on coordination, negotiation and bargaining, itÕs more of a zero-sum, group-based politics. It is literally, the cleavage is group-based. There are in-groups and out-groups that are competing with one another. You add in grievance, and you kind of have these questions of who belongs in our political system. That makes it very difficult to have negotiations and be productive in government. That makes government less productive and people become more aggrieved. It need not be a vicious cycle, though, insofar as, at some point Ð and I guess we'll see, like in the forthcoming elections Ð at some point, people É Populists are successful in opposition. When they come into government, it becomes a lot more difficult. And so the question is like, how much accountability is there when things are not done well? ThatÕs going to be up to how the system is structured and the extent to which voters, what their preferences are. I think that we're in a system that's structured in a pretty kind of nuanced and probably less-than-ideal way, but in a way that still can lead to turnover in power. I don't think it's all doom and gloom, but I think this is kind of the challenge that society faces. Thank you for your very patient attention.